

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT: "Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops of a Front (Army)", by Major-General M. Ivanov
(1961 1st Issue)

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

30 JUN 1992

Richard Helms

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Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence,
The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence
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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Increasing the Stability of Control
of the Troops of a Front (Army)", by Major-General
M. Ivanov

DATE OF INFO: Early 1961

APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B)

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled
"Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops of a Front (Army)",
by Major-General M. Ivanov.

This article appeared in the 1961 First Issue of a special
version of the Soviet military journal Military Thought (Voyennaya Mysl).
This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET
by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense
down to the level of Army Commander.

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Increasing the Stability of Control of the Troops
of a Front (Army)

by

Major-General M. Ivanov

The first issues of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" correctly state the problem concerning a review of the postulates of the theory of strategy, operational art, and tactics in light of the revolutionary changes which have come about in the realm of armament from the moment when nuclear weapons and missiles appeared on the scene. In the interests of the further development of military theory, we must decisively reject attempts to adapt old forms and methods of conducting military operations to new conditions, and we must work out comprehensively and profoundly the problems of modern combat and operations and the structure of the organizations pertaining to them, including the control organs.

As is known, the organizational structure of staffs is directly dependent upon methods of conducting combat operations and of equipping troops with the means of combat. At the present time, significant changes have taken place in armament, combat equipment, the nature of operations, and the methods of their conduct. Consequently, there should have been a corresponding change in the organization of staffs. However, this has not come about and in fact our operational organs of control, from the organizational standpoint, still remain at the level of the staffs of the World War II period.

In the interests of increasing the effectiveness of troop direction, the organization of operational staffs must, in our view, at least correspond to the following requirements:

- to ensure a capability for constant control of the readiness of missiles, aircraft, and nuclear warheads and of the location and movement of all objectives of nuclear attack;
- to preclude any lack of coordination in the actions of commanders of arms of troops and services; commanders of troops of the front (army) must work jointly with their immediate

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subordinates in one place, controlling and coordinating their actions; chiefs of directorates and services must decide all problems together, and not in isolation from one another;

--to eliminate disunity in the processing of data concerning a situation; all information must be concentrated in one place, in one organ so that it can be immediately available to the commander of troops of the front (army);

--to unify control of the weapons of destruction;

--to promote sufficient viability in the control organs.

At the present time, the organizational structure of operational staffs is based on the same division of labor and distribution of functions in the staff as existed many years ago. In this connection, now as in the past, a great number of elements takes part in implementing control of the troops of a front: combined-arms staff with many independent directorates (departments), the artillery staff, the air army staff, the PVO staff, the engineer directorate and others. In their work, all these elements depend upon one another and are constantly forced to coordinate their actions. If these organs are located at separate control points, coordination of their actions, even in accomplishing simple tasks, seriously hampers the work of the front (army) staff and leads to an extremely great loss of time.

Consider, for example, the planning of operations. As is known, the staffs of all the arms of troops, special troops, and services take part in this process together with the staff of the front (army), and the planning is carried out on a broad scale. But despite this, it still is a single, centralized process. Although they act on behalf of the common goal of the operation, all services and arms of troops work disconnectedly. As a consequence, planning breaks down: the operational plan is worked out in one place by one organ, the plan for the combat use of missiles and the artillery is worked out by another organ in another place, the plan for the combat use of aviation is worked out by a third organ in a third place, etc.... Because all these plans are closely tied in with one another and require constant coordination during their working out, the planning of operations extends over a long period of time.

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This principle of planning was tolerable as long as the factor of time did not play such a decisive role in the control of troops as it does at the present time.

The dynamic nature of operations and the striving of the opposing sides to seize the initiative will lead to one form of combat operations rapidly transforming into another without significant pauses. Those prolonged periods of preparation of operations, which now take place in our conduct of all types of training exercises, will vanish. Under these conditions, it is natural that staffs will be required to coordinate and execute an entire complex of complicated measures, which must be planned in short periods of time. Decisions must be implemented on a broad coordinated front, and very rapidly. Consequently, an urgent need arises to speed up and improve the process of planning. It seems to us, that in order to resolve this problem, it is advisable to have a single planning center in the composition of the field command of a front (army).

We carry out the direction of troops and the control of weapons of destruction in much the same manner as the planning of operations. At present, on the scale of a front, the combat operations of combined-arms large units (tank and motorized rifle troops) are under the immediate direction of the staff of the front (army), while the weapons of destruction are in the hands of the chief of the missile troops and artillery and his staff, of the commander and staff of the air army, of the chief of the PVO troops, and of the chief of the chemical troops. This situation also leads to great inconvenience in the control of troops and does not promote increased effectiveness in the work of the control organs.

We consider that unification of the functions of the direction of troops and the control of the weapons of destruction may prove to be not only beneficial but even extremely necessary.

In the work of the staffs, the rapid collection, processing and transmission of information materials to command echelons and troops become especially important. Today, it is extremely important to know at all times the exact location of all forces and weapons and their condition and readiness to fulfil combat tasks. For this reason, it is necessary that the staffs sharply reduce the time for processing information.

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However, the existing system for the collection of data on a situation is multi-staged. Information material, as formerly, is transmitted successively from one echelon to another: the regimental staff transmits information to the division staff, which transmits it to the army staff; it is only the army staff which informs the front staff of the situation. All directorates (departments), services and arms of troops engage in the collection of information at the scale of the front (army). Therefore, information on the situation is scattered among them. After reaching the front command post, the data on a situation are first studied and collated in the staffs of the arms of troops and the services, then they are reported and re-reported to various chiefs, and only after this are they reported to the commander. In order to have a complete picture of a situation, the front (army) staff and particularly the operations directorate (department), in addition to receiving information directly from subordinate staffs, is obliged to collect situation data from the staffs of arms of troops and from the services. Coming from various sources, many of these data are incomplete and contradictory, do not coincide in time, and require rechecking and clarification.

All this creates excessive red tape within the staff and finally leads to the fact that the collected and processed situation data do not correspond to the true troop situation at any given moment. In the army staff, the data lag behind by 1 or 2 hours, and in the front staff by 2 or 3 hours. The commander is deprived of the capability to influence the course of an operation in time, and often makes decisions according to a situation which, in reality, no longer exists.

In addition, the content of the information received by each service and arm of troops has much in common, and the requests for these data by various consumers create an extremely heavy load on subordinate staffs, upset them, and tear them away from the solution of other important and complex problems unnecessarily.

The necessity for all services and all staffs of arms of troops to collect information, which stems directly from the organization of the control organs, leads to the overloading of lines of communication, necessitates supplementary channels, and involves an increase in the expenditure of communications resources at control points; this in turn makes the staffs more cumbersome and less mobile. It should also be noted that all inquiries and reports on the situation and the operations of the troops are still made by means of message and radio signal codes, which greatly delays the collection and processing of information.

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It is perfectly obvious that such an information system has completely outlived its usefulness. In order to ensure rapid reactions by the command echelon and the staffs to a situation, it is necessary to centralize the collection and processing of information data. All information must be concentrated in one organ and be put on an overall map or screen. However, this can be done only after an appropriate reorganization of the control organs.

Intelligence should be considered separately. New demands are also being made on it, particularly on the process of collecting and processing data on the enemy. Carefully organized and unceasing intelligence work has become the guarantee of timely detection of enemy preparations for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Today, as never before, the combat readiness of troops and their ability to conduct successfully combat operations depend on intelligence operations. The fulfilment of all the tasks assigned to intelligence demands an even greater centralization of its resources, single control, and firmer direction. Without this, intelligence organs will hardly be able to play their part.

Even though this is obvious, the intelligence organs and their forces and means are still disconnected from the organizational standpoint. On the scale of a front, not only the intelligence directorate, but also the artillery staff, the air army staff, the engineer directorate, the chemical staff and others are engaged in intelligence. A similar situation exists in the staff of the army and in the staffs of large units. All these intelligence organs frequently work on their own, on behalf of only that arm of troops which they are called upon to serve, and if some of the information obtained by them does become the property of all the troops, it reaches them only after a very great delay.

It is completely understandable that such an organization of intelligence organs cannot, under modern conditions, ensure a high degree of effectiveness in the receipt of intelligence data. The role of this service has grown to such an extent that there is a direct necessity to combine all these organs into a single independent intelligence center, directly subordinate to the commander of troops of the front, and having all the means of intelligence at its disposal.

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Therefore, under the existing organization of the field command of a front (army), the efforts of all its elements are disunited; this gives rise to frequent confusion in the operations of various arms of troops, complicates coordination of the efforts of the various means of combat, and creates great difficulty in the rapid assignment of their combat missions.

In order to eliminate these shortcomings, and to ensure stable control of troops on the scale of a front (army), it is necessary to centralize drastically the direction of troop combat operations. The organizational structure of operational staffs must be changed correspondingly.

It appears to us that from the standpoint of centralization of the control of troops and weapons of destruction, the reorganization of control organs must proceed by way of unification of all the directorates (departments) and staffs of the arms of troops and services which are concerned with the direction of troops into single control centers.

In accordance with this, it is advisable, in our opinion, to have within the composition of the field command of a front (army):

- a main command-planning center;
- a nuclear/missile center;
- an operations center;
- an intelligence center;
- a PVO control center.

The main command-planning center must be the basic working organ of the commander of troops of the front. Here must be united all the currently existing control organs of the staffs of arms of troops and the services which are concerned with the planning of operations and the direction of troops. All the planning of an operation must take place in this center only. Centralized control of all means of combat, including ground troops, missile weapons, PVO, and aviation, will also be carried out from here simultaneously. The complement of

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this center will include generals and officers from all arms of troops and specialties. When located at the command post, the chief of staff of the front and all chiefs who are directly responsible for the direction of the operation must be located in this center together with the commander. For rapid analysis of the situation and decision-making, a single map of the operational and radiation situation, the aerial situation, and the situation of the PVO, and a map of the grouping and combat readiness of our missile weapons must be constantly maintained here. These maps should be mounted in a vertical position for observation, in the manner of the PVO screen.

In relation to the remaining echelons of the field command of the front (army), this center will be the directing organ. It should direct their activity in order to ensure rapid reaction of the command echelon to all changes in the situation.

The nuclear/missile center will be a united organ for controlling the weapons of destruction of the front. All the weapons of nuclear attack must be concentrated in the hands of the chief of this center, i.e. missiles of all types, bomber aircraft and others, which will undoubtedly improve and expedite their use.

Inasmuch as the overall plan for the use of nuclear/missile weapons will be implemented by the main command-planning center, the functions of the nuclear/missile center in this respect will consist of making all the essential calculations for the use of nuclear/missile weapons, calculations of the possibilities for neutralizing various targets, of the safe removal of our troops from the ground zeros of bursts, of the probable degree of destruction of the objectives, etc. In addition, it must keep track of the movement and readiness of the missile weapons of the front, maintain an operational record of the availability and receipt of missiles and the special charges for them, and maintain a graphic chart of their readiness.

The nuclear/missile center must have direct communications with all the weapons of nuclear attack and must coordinate all its work closely with the operations and intelligence centers which are the sources of information.

The operations center should engage in the collection and processing of data on the operational and radiation situation, decide questions of combat support, implement the transmission of combat tasks to the troops and control their fulfillment.

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All information on the location and operations of our troops and on the results of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides will be concentrated, summarized, and thoroughly analyzed in this center. This will permit the creation of the conditions for the uninterrupted processing of all data on the ground and aerial situations and will bring about completeness and a high degree of effectiveness in the collection and preparation of data, permitting decisions to be made rapidly by the commander of troops of the front (army). In order to achieve rapid processing of information, the operations center must have direct communications with all the formations of the front.

The activities of this center will be conducted through the chiefs of axes, who must process the data on the position of their troops on the appropriate operational axes and transmit commands received from the main command-planning center to the staffs of the appropriate formations (large units) for implementation.

Since our proposed organization of field command of a front (army) assumes the abolition of a number of currently existing services and directorates (engineer, chemical, and others) and the transfer of decisions on their problems to the operations center, the functions of this organ will be much broader than those carried out by the operations directorate. In connection with this, the operations center, as well as the main command-planning center, must have a complement of highly trained generals and officers from the appropriate arms of troops and specialties.

The intelligence center is assigned the collection and processing of all intelligence information. All the intelligence resources of the front are concentrated in the hands of this single organ; it must conduct intelligence work on behalf of all arms of troops and disseminate information concerning the enemy to all centers. For the nuclear/missile center, the intelligence center must keep an account of targets (objectives for nuclear attack), make an evaluation and general description of them, keep track of the movement of primary targets, calculate the most advantageous time and place for the delivery of nuclear strikes, pinpoint the coordinates of the targets and prepare the initial topographic and geodetic data. The chief of intelligence of the front should be the head of the intelligence center.

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This center must have direct communications with reconnaissance aircraft aloft, with radio reconnaissance means and with other important sources of intelligence information.

The PVO control center is designated for control of the PVO weapons, including the fighter aircraft of the front. Its mission will include directing the repulse of massed enemy aircraft and missile strikes. This center must have direct communications with all PVO weapons, with the staffs of aviation large units and with the intelligence center. It should be headed by the chief of PVO of the front.

We shall not stop to consider materiel, technical and other support. It appears to us that their organization must also be set up in accordance with the same principle.

This organizational structure of the field command of a front (army), will undoubtedly permit all its echelons to decide more effectively all the complex problems of troop control which are concerned with a common goal and a single concept. In addition, such an organizational structure of the operational staffs will correspond to a greater degree to modern methods of controlling troops, which are based on the use of the latest control equipment.

In our opinion, the organization of all subordinate staffs must also be built in accordance with this same principle.

In order to increase the flexibility of control, along with the proposed changes in the organizational structure of the field command of a front (army), it is necessary to review the means and methods of work of the staffs in the area of collection, analysis and transmission of information data.

Without going into a detailed description of this problem, we believe that the information system must ensure that all interested elements receive the data on a situation as the events occur. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to make some changes in the procedure for sending reports at the level of the division, army and front. Along with a periodic presentation, say 1 or 2 times a day, of the more substantial reports with a description of the positions and operations of the two sides which are now presented, it is essential to organize the transmission of short signals to indicate only the

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lines attained by the units of the first echelon and the nature of their combat operations ("I am advancing", "I am defending", "I am withdrawing", etc.). These signals must be transmitted by the staffs of large units every 30 to 40 minutes according to a strictly established schedule. In order to send these signals, the division staffs could take data from the battalions which come in automatically through the use of course-plotters (kursoprokladchik) and determine for every given moment only the precise location of the battalion command post (the center of the combat formation).

It must be supposed that this simplification of reporting and elimination of intermediate elements will permit the staff of the front to have precise data on the position of the first echelon troops 30 minutes after the units reach any line. Experience from wars and exercises indicates that these data, especially under complex situational conditions, are sufficient to enable the commander to react instantaneously to the course of events.

In this connection, reality requires the establishment of a procedure for transmitting information by which each command echelon can relay information on the position of its troops and the enemy directly to the next higher staff: the regimental staff to the army staff, the division staff to the front staff, and simultaneously to relay this information correspondingly to the division and army staffs also.

We have examined above only one of the questions of incongruity in the organizational structure of operational staffs due to the changed nature of combat operations. A second problem, which is directly related to the organization of control organs and which, in our opinion, is also in need of review, is the problem of control points.

The increased importance of uninterrupted control of troops provides a basis for assuming that in future operations staffs will be one of the primary targets of enemy action. The combatants will adopt every measure to disorganize the work of control organs and to disrupt the direction of troops. For this purpose, strikes by missiles or aircraft may be delivered, diversionary groups may be sent out, and jamming may be conducted against the means of communication. The capability of using nuclear weapons creates a real threat of instantaneous removal from action of entire control echelons and large bodies of troops. Therefore, the organization of operational staffs must be subordinated first of all to guaranteeing their vitality and ability to retain control in the most complex situation.

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Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this may be achieved by creating dispersed, more ramified, and constantly operative networks of control points to ensure rapid replacement of points which have been put out of action, and broad continuity in the control of troops.

In an operational element, the solution to this problem is reflected by the creation in formations of control points, command and forward command posts, and also rear control points. In this connection, it is believed that the existence of these points permits successful control of a large number of troops and weapons of destruction.

In our opinion, such an organization and echeloning of control points in the front (army) cannot sufficiently ensure their vitality under new conditions and, consequently, does not promote increased stability of control.

The creation of several points for the control of front (army) troops is justified only when each of them functions constantly, is fully independent and is capable of assuming troop control in the event that another point is destroyed by an enemy nuclear strike. Unfortunately, front (army) command and forward command posts, as they are at present constituted, do not meet these requirements. The basic reasons for this consist of the following.

In the first place, despite its numerical strength, the T/O of the field control of a front (army) does not in fact provide for the creation of two full-fledged control points. For this reason, only one independent control element, the command post, is actually created in a front (army). The forward command post is organized by using the forces and means of the command post. In its make-up it is usually a temporary and poorly organized control organ and, naturally, cannot fully provide the commander with firm direction of troops in the event that the command post is put out of action.

Secondly, the forward command post is not a constantly functioning control organ, because it is usually created only for the period of the conduct of combat operations. During the preparation for an operation, the generals and officers and the transportation and communications means designated for the command and forward command posts are usually located together at the command post.

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It must not be overlooked that the enemy will seek out and destroy control points, not only during the course of combat operations, but also during the period of preparation for an offensive and during the organization of defense. For this reason, it is quite obvious that with the personnel and the means of control of the command and forward command posts all located in one place, even for a short interval of time, there is serious danger of their simultaneous destruction and the actual removal from action of the entire control of the front (army), which can undoubtedly cause complete disruption of the control of a large number of troops.

Thirdly, the very fact of the creation of a forward command post predetermines its place and role in an operation. As is known, it moves forward on one of the axes, as close as possible to the front, so that the commander can feel the "pulse" of the combat and observe it to the extent possible. Almost all the chiefs of directorates (departments), services, and the commanders of arms of troops arrive at this post together with the commander, all communications channels are switched here, and in this manner the center of gravity in the control of troops is transferred entirely to the forward command post. Thus, because of this, the command post, with all the means of control, becomes an unnecessary attribute and actually participates only indirectly in the direction of troop combat operations.

We consider this to be nothing more than a vestige of the past. The tendency to move the commander and his observation post forward to the troop combat formations was justified in the years of World War II, when operations developed relatively methodically, when front formations and armies had a comparatively shallow operational formation [4 or 5 words missing] means of control permitting direct influence on the course of operations from command posts far removed from the troops.

Now, however, when the nature and conditions of conducting operations have changed sharply, such a situation cannot be acknowledged as correct. In the future, the basic method of conducting combat operations will be mass nuclear/missile strikes, carried out with the aim of simultaneous mass destruction, not so much of troops located on the line of combat contact of the opposing sides, as of objectives located in the rear area. The center of gravity of combat operations under these conditions can shift from the zone of combat contact to the depth of the disposition of front (army) troops. The former

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linear formations and operations of troops will also disappear, engagements will be conducted on axes and in separate areas, and operations in the rear area will frequently begin before the advance of ground troops from the front.

It is perfectly obvious that in making decisions in such a situation it is insufficient to be guided by the picture of combat on one axis. In order to react both correctly and quickly to the course of combat operations, the commander must constantly be aware of the entire situation. But this is only possible if, during the course of the entire operation, he is supported by the basic personnel of the front staff who are located at the command post in the area of the main grouping of troops. If, however, during the course of an operation, the commander is located primarily at a forward command post on only one of the axes, he will be unavoidably detached from the overall situation and will be unable to influence not only the development of the operation as a whole but even the most important changes which may arise at any moment away from the forward command post. Under these conditions, it is difficult to say where the presence of the commander will be required first--forward, on one of the flanks or in the rear of the front's troops.

Deep disposition of front (army) troops, particularly of reserves, missile units, airborne troops, and the possibility of committing large units to battle in a hurry from the depth also make the forward move of the commander and the forward command post senseless, because in essence it causes him to be detached from the main forces. In the control of troops, emphasis must now be placed not on personal observation of the field of combat and on personal contact of the front troops commander with the commanders of large units, but on control from a distance. Of course, even under modern conditions, the commander must visit certain axes for the immediate direction of battle, particularly during the critical moments of the development of an operation. But this will take place only incidentally and will not be the system to which we adhere today.

It is also essential to consider the fact that the evolution of means of control is proceeding in the direction of complex automation of the processes of direction of troop combat activity, and it must be assumed that staffs will soon be equipped with automated systems. However, the relatively large size of these systems and the complexity of their apparatus limit their maneuverability and permit their effective use only at the command post.

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Fourthly, the necessity for an auxiliary control point will often arise in the course of an offensive operation as well as in defense, especially when we succeed in breaking up the enemy's operational formation and in cutting off part of his troops from the main grouping, and when the operation therefore disintegrates into a number of engagements. However, at present it is impossible to do this because of the limited capabilities in forces and means of the operational staffs, which are capable of creating only command and forward command posts from their complement.

And, fifthly, as has already been mentioned, as a result of changes in the situation, critical moments may arise on individual axes in an operation, requiring the personal presence of the commander and his involvement in the direction of troop combat operations. But the existing organization of control points and the means of communications and movement available to the staffs do not permit the commander to move rapidly to these sectors of the front. The forward command post is obviously not suited to accomplishing such tasks since it is too cumbersome, insufficiently mobile, and it is impossible to conceal its location in the vicinity of the enemy. However, there is no other organ for this purpose in a front or army.

Another important condition in increasing the viability of control points is their reliable security (okhrana), defense, and combat support. The constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons against control points and the increased possibilities of an attack on them by mobile units of enemy ground troops, diversionary groups, and airborne troops indicate the necessity for having sufficiently strong special organic security and support units for the protection of staffs.

During World War II subunits and units from the troops were usually used for the preparation, support, and, frequently, also for the defense of control points. This led to disengaging combat subunits from the accomplishment of important tasks at the immediate front and was not justified. As a rule, temporarily detached subunits and units were not suitable in their organization, equipment, training, and experience for accomplishing the tasks of preparing and supporting control points. The productivity and quality of their work was low, despite the fact that a large quantity of personnel and equipment was detached, part of the equipment was not used because of the impossibility of using it in the preparation of control points, and work was performed separately and was not united under a single command.

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The situation concerning the security, defense, and support of control points is also in approximately this same state, even at the present time. The security and service regiment provided for by the T/O&E and attached to the front staff, and the battalion attached to the army staff do not have organic, engineer, chemical, and other special subunits at their disposal. This situation, as in the years of the last war, again leads to the fact that it will be necessary to use temporary and untrained special line units and subunits for the preparation, support, and servicing of control points.

Entirely different results can be achieved if these subunits are united and if on the basis of them, special units are created, equipped with the necessary weapons, equipment and the other standard items required for the combat support, servicing, and preparation of control points. The personnel of these units who are trained in advance will also acquire experience. On the whole, significantly greater effectiveness in the use of these same forces and means will be achieved and the organization and conduct of the security, defense, servicing, and support of control points will be greatly improved.

The problem of the direction of the entire security service for control points and of the maintenance of the required order in them is still decided by us in the old manner. Up to the present time, apart from the staff commandants, many staff officers who are insufficiently trained and inexperienced in this respect engage in this work, while having more than one function.

The growing volume of activities and the broadening functions of the commandant's service (komendantskaya sluzhba), as well as the necessity of carrying it out constantly, have drastically elevated the role of this service; it has now acquired the importance of one of the main elements in troop control. This circumstance requires centralization of the direction of the commandant's service, the placing of a strong independent organ at its head, and the subordination to it of all the forces and means assigned for the security and preparation of control points. In our opinion, only with this condition is it possible to resolve more purposefully and effectively the important problems of security and defense, of antiatomic protection, engineer preparation, and the concealed placement and transfer of control points and constantly to maintain the strictest order in their disposition areas, all of which will directly affect the viability of control organs.

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Therefore, all these arguments permit a restatement of the conclusion that the existing organizational structure of operational staffs does not provide for the creation in a front (army) of a ramified network of control points which in turn does not promote an increase in the flexibility and stability of troop control. The organization of operational staffs, it appears to us, must be such as to ensure the creation of not less than two permanently operative full-fledged control points in a front (army) for all forms of combat operations and to provide the opportunity for the commander, in certain cases, to personally and directly participate in the direction of troops in the most important sectors.

For this purpose, it is essential, in our opinion, to have two independent control organs in the composition of the field command of a front and army.

The first is the staff of the front (army), including the basic complement of the field command and all the above-mentioned centers. On the basis of it, it is necessary to develop the command post of the front (army) as the primary control point, headed directly by the front (army) troop commander.

The second is the staff operations group (organic). This control organ must be somewhat smaller in its composition than the staff but must have an organization similar to that of the staff. As an independent control organ, the group must have its own organic means of communications and transportation in such quantity as to make it capable of assuming complete control of all the troops of the front in the event that the command post is put out of action. On the basis of the staff operations group, regardless of the situation, a second permanent control point of the front (army) must be created and headed by the deputy front (army) troop commander. Its title and designation will be determined each time by the specific conditions of the situation. Therefore, during the preparation for an offensive operation and in defense, this will usually be an alternate command post, but during the course of the operation it can become an auxiliary control point or can carry out the functions characteristic of the forward command post.

In peacetime, the personnel of the staff operations group should be located and worked in the appropriate control centers, in order to facilitate the work and perfect the skills of the officers. During

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the training of staffs, this operations group must be prepared and knitted together as an independent control organ.

For the transportation of the commander and his deputy to any particular axis where their personal intervention in the direction of troop combat operations may be required, it is essential to have specially allotted control vehicles in the T/O&E of the staff of the front and the staff operations group.

For the security and combat support of control points, it is advisable to create special units and subunits and to include them in the T/O of the field control of the front (army). In our opinion, they should be called commandant's units (komendatskaya chast). It appears to be advisable to use organic commandant's regiments and separate commandant's battalions as the organizational basis. For servicing the command posts and rear control point of the front, it is essential to have a commandant's regiment for each of them; for servicing the staff operations group of the front and the command post of the army, to have separate commandant's battalions.

For direction of the commandant's service and of the security, defense preparation, and support of control points, it is essential to create in the staffs commandaturas (commandant's groups) with a complement of 5 to 8 officers headed by the commandant to whom the commandant's units and subunits must be subordinated. These will be organic, independent, and influential organs which possess the necessary forces and means and are capable of maintaining order at control points and of directing their relocation, security, and defense under any conditions.

The daily activity of the commandaturas must be carried out through permanent duty commandants. In this connection, and also on the basis of the proposed changes in the structure of staffs, we consider it advisable to abolish the operational duty officer in the staffs, particularly since he is no longer in a position to fulfil functions concerned with the collection of situation data which he has been charged with to the present time.

The presence of organic commandaturas will permit the concentration of the direction of all measures of security of control points in one element and in one place, will bring order to the commandant's service,

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and will significantly elevate its authority. In addition, this will release many chiefs and officers of staffs from their involvement in the organization and direction of the commandant's service and will give them the opportunity to spend more time on their immediate duties.

We propose a broad study of the questions which have been raised and a more rapid realization of the necessary changes in the structure and methods of work of control organs.

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